Eleventh-Century Commercial Developments in Angkor and Champa

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Recent scholarship has speculated that there were two forms of "classical" Southeast Asian states in pre-modern Southeast Asia, one associated with the inland wet rice states of the Southeast Asian mainland and Java, and the other represented by the thalassocracy of Srivijaya.[1] It is suggested that while the wet-rice states derived their income from the land, the Srivijaya state depended more upon income from its external contacts — income generated from Srivijaya's participation in the East-West international maritime route which passed through the Malacca Straits region. It is held, however, that the classical states, whether landed or maritime in their focus, had a good deal in common. One dominant characteristic of Southeast Asia's classical states was their "centre" orientation; each state's capital acted as the centre of the king's domain, the centre of his administration and royal cult, and the focus of the king's power and authority. The centre drew in the resources of the realm — tribute, talent, men, and goods — which were then used to support the ruler's power. Via various redistributive mechanisms, classical rulers tapped their centre's treasury to share these resources with their supporters: this redistribution sometimes took the form of direct payments, or more generally this sharing of prosperity was indirect, as for example in the endowment of temples.[2]

Such processes of redistributing a king's economic resources were vital to the system's very existence, yet historical analysis of Southeast Asia's classical states has only begun to examine these economic mechanisms within political systems whose colourful political and religious history has tended to obscure their economic pursuits, even though a state's political and religious activities derived much of their vitality from the state's economic policies. A basic premise of this discussion is that economic history is critical to our understanding of the precolonial era, and that studies of the economic dimension of Southeast Asia's history can generate fresh insights into the history of the pre-modern period by applying a variety of conceptual models to readily accessible materials, including published epigraphical data of the type utilized extensively in this paper. This study examines the economic resources of two classical

[1] Summarized in Kenneth R. Hall, "An Introductory Essay on Southeast Asian Statecraft in the Classical Period", in *The Origins of Southeast Asian Statecraft*, ed. Kenneth R. Hall and John K Whitmore (Ann Arbor, 1976), pp. 1–24.

[2] Not only do the epigraphic records of temple endowments emphasize the theoretical powers of the state, but each endowment also provides for the economic development of the area surrounding the temple. This development might take the form of the assignment of a labour force to work temple lands, provision for the construction of local irrigation systems which would serve temple and local lands, or the hiring of artisans who would construct a new temple or repair an old one, but who would require the services of a local population to supply their daily needs.

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states of Southeast Asia's mainland, Angkor and Champa, and attempts to discern the impact of commerce upon each state's rulers and their state's system of statecraft.

Patterns of Trade in Southeast Asia from the Fifth through the Eleventh Centuries

O.W. Wolters has demonstrated that by the early fifth century A.D., a major transition had occurred in that section of the international maritime route which crossed Southeast Asia.[3] This international route worked itself via a series of links through Southeast Asia towards China; Southeast Asia's ports served as regional entrepôt, servicing the shipping passing along the international route and occasionally feeding in local goods. Coming from the Mediterranean, this route went to the west coast of India, around to the east coast, and across the Bay of Bengal. While in earlier centuries the specific points of contact were the west and east coasts of the upper Malay Peninsula connected by overland transport, and the port of Oc-eo on the western edge of the Mekong Delta,[4] in the early fifth century the route no longer crossed the Malay Peninsula but went instead through the Straits of Malacca to make direct contact with the northwestern edge of the Java Sea region. Wolters believes that, despite contacts between parts of Java and south China, over the next two centuries Southeast Asia's trading centre came to lie on the southeast coast of Sumatra.[5] Out of this development rose the classical maritime state of Srivijaya.[6] Located on the "favoured coast" of southeastern Sumatra, the Srivijayan empire stood between the flow of international trade and the wealth of Java and beyond.

In Wolters' analysis, the rise of this state and its subsequent history were intimately linked to the rise and fall of the T'ang dynasty and the vast wealth that a unified and prosperous China meant. Having emerged from the mass of harbour states competing for a place on the trade route in the seventh century, Srivijaya gained control of the seas in the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca, put down piracy and competition, and established a cosmopolitan trading centre on the southeastern Sumatra coast. The ports of Srivijaya then furnished passing traders with supplies, local products, Chinese and Western goods, storage facilities, and hostelries for waiting out the monsoon season.[7]

Through the ninth and tenth centuries, when the T'ang state was slowly collapsing and China was splintering into numerous small political entities, the trade — which emphasized aromatics and drugs, particularly from the Middle East, in exchange for Chinese silks and other exotic luxury items from points between — seems not to have decreased in any great degree owing to the efforts of the Southern Han and Min

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[3] O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce* (Ithaca, 1967), pp. 34–36.

[4] Ibid., ch. 2.

[5] Ibid., pp. 162–68, 175–76, ch. 13.

[6] See Kenneth R. Hall, "State and Statecraft in Early Srivijaya", in *Southeast Asian Statecraft*, pp. 61–105.

[7] The Chinese "tribute" system by which the T'ang regulated their relationship with Srivijaya and other Southeast Asian states was essentially political with economic implications [see O.W. Wolters, *The Fall in Srivijaya in Malay History* (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 39–48]. On the one hand, any political strife could disrupt the flow of trade; on the other, the maintenance of political stability and the establishment of entrepôt like Srivijaya were seen as laying the foundation for and encouraging this flow.

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regimes based respectively in Canton and Fu-chou.[8] In this age, the Srivijaya empire came to dominate not only the Straits of Malacca but also the upper Malay Peninsula, including Tambralinga (Ligor) on the east coast and the "Kalah" area on the western Kra, which had become the centre for Arab-Persian traders.[9]

In the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, however, shifting international and regional economic and political conditions began to loosen the trade route and Srivijaya's control over it. Where previously the political development of the region was such that there had been little conflict among major regional powers, the tenth century saw the beginning of such hostilities. The empires of Angkor and Pagan were growing on the mainland and beginning to involve themselves in international trade, and east Java began to take advantage of the natural wealth at the disposal of the Java Sea region and was developing its own independent trade.[10] Added to this competition was the major upsurge in trade tied to the reunification of China under the Sung dynasty and its efforts to reopen the communications of the Southern Seas (Nan-yang) over the final third of the tenth century.

Srivijaya's position was seriously weakened as the political and economic strains proved too great. First, the Srivijayan ruler sought to consolidate his position with diplomatic overtures to the Tamil section of the east coast of India to the west and the Sung to the north, and then followed with a war against Java. A devastating raid against eastern Java in 1016 allowed the Srivijaya ruler to refer to himself when he sent a richly laden mission to China the following year as "king of the ocean lands".[11] Yet, within a decade, the Cōla power in South India had sacked the legendary riches of the Srivijaya capital and for the next fifty years was to play a role in the politics of the Straits area.[12] The Cōḷa attack of 1025 shattered Srivijaya's hegemony, disrupting the concentration of the international route through the Srivijayan ports, and by the last quarter of the eleventh century the trading pattern had become more diffuse.

No longer was Srivijaya and its subordinate harbours the single focus of the international route through Southeast Asia. The ports of east Java began to surpass them in wealth, drawing traders from India and the merchants of Southeast Asia as well as from the eastern islands, and Chinese maritime vessels were for the first

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[8] E.H. Schafer, *The Empire of Min* (Rutland, Vermont, 1954), pp. 75–78. There was for a period, however, as discussed below, a shift of the foreign merchant community's residence to ports on the Vietnamese coast.

[9] See Kenneth R. Hall and John K. Whitmore, "Southeast Asian Trade and the Isthmian Struggle, 1000–1200 A.D. ", in *Southeast Asian Statecraft,* pp. 307–8. As discussed below, there is current controversy whether Srivijaya was a continuous entity during this era, or if we may better understand Srivijaya's ever-expanding authority as being at best intermittent between the seventh and eleventh centuries [see Bennet Bronson, "Palembang as Srivijaya: The Lateness of Early Cities in Southern Southeast Asia", *Asian Perspectives* (forthcoming)]. Thai historians currently view the Ligor area as being the Srivijayan capital for most, if not all, of this era [see, for example, M.C. Chand Chirayu Rajani, "Background of the Srivijaya Story", *Journal of the Siam Society* 62, 1 (1974): 174–211; 62, 2 (1974): 285–324].

[10] See Jan Wisseman, "Markets and Trade in Pre-Islamic Java", in *Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia*, ed. Karl L. Hutterer (Ann Arbor, 1978), pp. 197–212.

[11] Wolters, *Fall of Sri Vijaya*, pp. 1, 14.

[12] See Kenneth R. Hall, "International Trade and Foreign Diplomacy in Early Medieval South India", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 21, 1 (1978): 75–98.

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time sailing the Southeast Asian seas and going beyond them into the Indian Ocean, attempting to go more directly to the sources of local products — especially spices.[13] The small harbours of northern Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula began to act independently of the once great power to the south and to profit from the variety of traders now plying the sea routes.[14]

Chao Ju-kua, Superintendant of Maritime Trade at Ch'uan-chou and author of the *Chu-fan-chih*,[15] a 1225 work on maritime trading patterns, which must have derived much of its information from seamen and traders themselves, reflects the Sung perception of the Southeast Asian world, dividing Southeast Asia into an Upper Shore (Shang An), involving the mainland and the peninsula, a region with which the Chinese had had contact in prior centuries, and a Lower Shore (Hsia An), covering Sumatra and the Java Sea whose trading network had been controlled by Srivijaya. On the former were Champa, Cambodia, and the east coast of the Malay Peninsula; the latter included the "favoured coast" of southern Sumatra, the ports of Java, and the south coast of Borneo.

Angkor's Development under Sūryavarman I

North of the Straits of Malacca, the economic systems of the upper Malay Peninsula and its hinterland in the Menam and Irrawaddy river valleys were also drawn into this commercial upsurge. While these areas did not feed directly into the central maritime route which was shifting south to the Java Sea, they were full participants in regional commercial channels within the Bay of Bengal.[16] By the first half of the eleventh century, the Khmers of Cambodia had pushed their control to the west into the Menam valley of present Thailand and towards the Kra Isthmus of the peninsula. Where tenth-century Cambodia's commercial interests had been directed towards the eastern portion of its land, Sūryavarman I (1002–1050) reversed this pattern with his activities in the west.[17] Sūryavarman's extension of Khmer administration into the Lopburi region had strong economic implications, for control of the lower Menam provided access to international commerce at Tambralinga on the eastern Kra, giving the Khmer a more direct contact with the international trade routes than had previously been the case.

The Cambodian state of Angkor faced an absence of natural conditions which would have allowed the expansion of its economic base and thus, I would argue, limited the Khmer state's potential for extending its political authority. An artificial core was thereupon created during the ninth through the eleventh centuries, as an

[13] Wolters, *Fall of Sri Vijaya*, pp. 42–48.

[14] Hall and Whitmore, "Southeast Asian Trade", p. 328, fn. 12; and Kenneth R. Hall, "The Coming of Islam to the Archipelago: A Reassessment", in *Economic Exchange*, pp. 213–32.

[15] F.W. Hirth and W.W. Rockhill, *Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu-fan-chi* (St. Petersburg, 1911), pp. 35–39. See also Paul Wheatley, "Geographical Notes on Some Commodities involved in Sung Maritime Trade", *Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 32, 2 (1959): 5–8, 16–17.

[16] Hall and Whitmore, "Southeast Asian Trade".

[17] For a detailed analysis of the evidence for commercial activity in the Khmer domain during Sūryavarman's reign, see Kenneth R. Hall, "Khmer Commercial Development and Foreign Contacts under Sūryavarman I", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 18, 3 (1975): 318–36.

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elaborate system of state-controlled irrigation works was constructed around the Khmer capital. In the 890s, the Khmer monarch Yaśovarman I was responsible for the construction of the eastern *baray* (an artificial lake) at Angkor; a second *baray*, said to have been initiated by Sūryavarman I in the mid-eleventh century, at least doubled the cultivable land available at the state's centre.[18]

To encourage the expansion of wet-rice cultivation into these lands, royal assignments (grants) of landed estates were made to Khmer elite. In some cases manpower, that is, an agricultural work force, was also supplied. This work force might be gained by moving a population, possibly "war captives", from an area peripheral to the state's core domain into these newly developed lands. These local estates were then integrated both symbolically and physically into the state's economic network via the state's ritual network. To acquire and maintain their legitimacy, local temples, founded on the new landed estates by the Khmer elite, appear to have been required to relinquish a certain percentage of their annual harvest in order to support the state's central temples.[19] Agricultural expansion in turn financed the dramatic political expansion of the Khmer state at that time. The resulting economic prosperity is also reflected in the urban development that took place in the tenth and eleventh centuries, a growth which reached its fullness under Sūryavarman I.[20]

Merchants active in the Khmer domain shared in the prosperity generated by the Khmer empire's agrarian base. There are over twenty specific references to merchant activity in the period from the reign of Harsavarman I (922) to that of Harsavarman III (1071). Commercial growth culminated during Sūryavarman I's reign (1002–1050), as new commercial opportunities available from the extension of Khmer administrative control into the region north of the Dangrek mountain range and into the former Dvaravati area of modern Lopburi in the west led to the development of new commercial networks. Although the Khmer state was an inland wet-rice state, anything useful to the economic strength of the realm was encouraged. Thus Sūryavarman himself was active in furthering Khmer commercial aspiration by attempting to establish regular commercial intercourse with the Cōla state in southern India and the Lý state in Vietnam.[21]

While the Khmer initially appear to have taken an interest in extending their commercial influence into the Malay Peninsula during the early eleventh century, by the end of the century internal political strife as well as external pressures on their eastern borders occupied the Khmer rulers. Around 1050, the Khmer relationship with the Kra Isthmus was challenged by Burmese expansion into the Malay

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[18] Bernard P. Groslier, *Angkor et le Cambodge au XVIe siecle* (Paris, 1958), pp. 108–12.

[19] L.A. Sedov, "On the Problem of the Economic System in Angkor Cambodia in the IX-XII Centuries", *Narody Asii i Afriki, Istoriia, Ekonomika, Kul'tura* 6 (ANSSSR, 1963), 73–81. I have used a translation from the Russian done by Antonia Glasse for Prof. O.W. Wolters of Cornell University.

[20] Epigraphy mentions only 12 place names ending in *-pura*, a Sanskrit term used to identify urban areas, during the reign of Jayavarman IV (928–942), 24 in the period of Rājendravarman II (944–968), 20 under Jayavarman V (968–1001), but 47 — more than double those of his immediate predecessors — in the reign of Sūryavarman I [see H. de Mestier du Bourg, "La premier moitie de XIe siecle au Cambodge: Suryavarman Ier, sa vie et quelques aspects des institutions a son epoque", *Journal Asiatique* (henceforth *JA*) 268, 3–4 (1970): 308].

[21] Hall, "Khmer Commercial Development", p. 331–36.

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Peninsula; the Khmer seem to have offered little resistence.[22] About this same year Cham raids sacked Sambupura on the Mekong and Sūryavarman died.[23] Shortly thereafter, the centre of Khmer political authority shifted north into the Mun River valley beyond the Dangrek mountain range. A general commercial withdrawal is reflected as Khmer epigraphy displays little interest in further commercial developments until the late twelfth century.

Although the evidence indicates more than a casual involvement, the Khmer state's participation in the international commercial routes must be regarded as a secondary concern of Sūryavarman and its other monarchs. This was because of the commitment of Angkor's rulers to develop their domain's agrarian base around Angkor as well as to overcome Cambodia's peripheral position, geographically speaking, to the major East-West maritime routes. Thus Sūryavarman expanded his economic base by initiating the construction of a second *baray*, extending his political hegemony from his core domain, and then made diplomatic overtures to the Cōḻa and Ly. With Sūryavarman's death, his successors, for reasons cited, chose to internalize Khmer polity rather than promoting a stronger interaction in the supra-regional trade routes. For the Khmer state's neighbour to the southeast, the Cham state which controlled the southern portion of modern Vietnam, there appears to have been a more compelling local desire to participate in these international commercial channels.

Champa and International Commerce: The Development of Contacts in the Eighth Century

Chinese dynastic references to the Cham state of *Lin-yi* date to A.D. 192; in A.D. 605 a Chinese general is said to have undertaken the task of forcibly opening the region for trade.[24] This Cham state, its capital at Tra-kiêu near modern Đa Nang, seems to have reacted favourably, and soon became a secondary entrepôt on the main international route, servicing shipping and sailors travelling between the Malay world and Canton. By 758, the Chinese report that the Cham state had developed commercial centres at Nha-trang (Kauthāra) and Phan-rang (Pāṇḍuranga) and begin to call the state *Huan-wang*.[25]

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[22] G.H. Luce, *Old Burma, Early Pagan*, I (Locust Valley, New York, 1969), 21–23, 26, as discussed in Hall and Whitmore, "Southeast Asian Trade", p. 330, fn. 20.

[23] Hall and Whitmore, p. 308.

[24] George Coedès, *The Making of Southeast Asia* (Berkeley, 1966), p. 77.

[25] Wang Gangwu, "The Nanhai Trade", *Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 31, 2 (1958): 90–91. In 875 a new Cham dynasty came to power at Indrapura (Quang-nam), and reference in Chinese sources is henceforth made to *Chan-ch'eng*, "the Cham city", or Champapura. See Georges Maspero, *Le Royaume de Champa* (Paris and Brussels, 1928), p. 6. That the Chinese incorrectly thought of the Cham domain as principally a maritime state is reflected in Lê Tắc's *Annam Chí-lúóc*, written in China in the early 14th century by a Vietnamese, which gives the following brief note on Champa (Chan-ch'eng-kuo): "[They] established [their] state on the shore of the sea. Chinese merchant ships cross the sea. The outer barbarians who come and go all congregate here to take on fuel and water." Lê Tắc, *Annam Chí-lúóc* (Hue, 1961), p. 31 (in Chinese). John K. Whitmore of the University of Michigan's Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies had provided me with this translation.

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In general, Cham epigraphy reflects an internally oriented wet-rice state which was organizationally similar in many ways to the Khmer state at Angkor.[26] The Cham state had a well-developed system of classical Southeast Asian statecraft, focusing its legitimacy upon a Hindu-Buddhist cult which emphasized the Cham king's association with Śiva and his consort Bhadrādhipatīśvara. In the seventh and eighth centuries, this internal orientation was somewhat refocused as Champa's history became more intimately connected to events precipitated by the external world. An important factor in this reorientation was the fact that the Cham coast was strategically located on the principal maritime route between the Srivijaya empire and China,[27] a position which allowed the Chams the opportunity to take advantage of the economic benefits offered by participation in the route.

As opposed to their normal void of information on commerce, merchants, and the sea trade in general, inscriptions dating to the eighth century report two sea raids which threatened the state's very existence. A Sanskrit inscription from Nha-trang informs us that in 774 "Men born in other countries, men living on food more horrible than corpses, terrifying, thin, and entirely black, as fierce and as remorseless as death, who came in ships ... "[28] desecrated the Po Nagar temple near Nha-trang. This was followed by a second raid by a similar group in 787, when a Cham temple at Pāṇḍuranga was burned.[29] Historians have traditionally identified these lean, black, and demonic seafarers with Javanese or Malay sailors — a group similar to the sea nomads who O.W. Wolters has proposed were the strength behind the Malay state of Srivijaya's hegemony[30] — seamen who could be used to control shipping, but who in times of political turmoil might turn to piracy as the source of their livelihood.

To understand these eighth-century inscriptions, we must examine the Cham state's relationship to the trade routes in that period. Since both raids were directed not at the Cham capital near Đa Nang but at the two port areas recognized by the Chinese as being of commercial importance, the Malay raids reflect two possible conditions. If the Srivijaya state were still the dominant power in the straits region,[31]

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[26] See Maspero, op. cit., passim. The principal Cham epigraphic records utilized in this study are collected in the following: A. Aymonier, "Premiere etude sur les inscriptions Tchames", *JA* 17 (1891): 1–86; M. Abel Bergaigne, "Inscriptions Sanscrites de Campa" (henceforth *ISC*), *Notices et extraits des Manuscrits de la bibliotheque nationale et autres bibliotheques* ,.. (Paris, 1883), pp. 181–292.

[27] Champa was in a position to inherit the entrepôt position filled in earlier centuries by Funan to the south [see Paul Pelliot, "Le Fou-nan", *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient* (henceforth *BEFEO*) 3 (1903): 248–303]. However, as discussed above, the Malay state of Srivijaya assumed Funan's former position as Southeast Asia's chief entrepôt on the maritime route in the 7th century and maintained this position until the 11th century. Champa's position on the maritime route, as recognized by the Chinese, was that of a secondary port.

[28] *ISC*, p. 253.

[29] Aymonier, op. cit., p. 191, and *ISC*, p. 217.

[30] Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce*; idem, *Fall of Sri Vijaya*. Wolters sees Southeast Asian mariners, Malays in particular, supplying the ships and manpower needed to carry the commerce between the South Asian subcontinent and China.

[31] The Ligor Inscription from the eastern Malay coast, dated 775, suggests that the Srivijaya monarch held political authority over the Southern Seas during the 8th century [see K.A. Nilankanta Sastri, *The History of Srivijaya* (Madras, 1949), p. 120, for a translation of the Ligor inscription]. There is some debate, however, whether Srivijaya's authority during that period was being exercised from Sumatra or from Java. [See J.G. deCasparis, *Prasasti Indonesia* 2 (Bandung, 1956): 15–46, 258–61,

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then the rise to prominence of the Cham ports located in the southern areas of the Cham coast might well have posed a threat to Srivijaya's economic hegemony over the southern maritime route.[32] In this instance, the raids may be explained as having been initiated by Srivijaya to prevent the further development of the Cham ports as rivals to Srivijaya.[33] Alternatively, if Srivijaya were no longer a viable political force during the eighth century, as an archeologist has recently proposed,[34] then the raids on the Cham ports may be seen as having been undertaken by sea pirates — groups who had formerly supported Srivijaya's control over the Southern Seas, but who in the eighth century were turning to piracy as the source of their livelihood. Champa's ports, recognized in that period as prosperous centres of commerce, presented attractive sources of plunder.

Chinese records help to explain the circumstances surrounding these events. The eighth century was a period of political turmoil in southern China following the rebellion of An Lu-Shan in 756. When Canton, the major Chinese port of that period, was sacked by a rebel Chinese army in 758, Canton's foreign merchant community, especially the Persians, Arabs, and other merchants who participated in the southern maritime route, began to shift their commercial operations to the Vietnamese coast. Chinese sources lamented that thereafter "only four or five vessels of the barbarians of the south and west (or southwest) come each year".[35]

The Hanoi area seems to have benefited most from this relocation of the foreign merchant community's base of operations. A late eighth-century (792) Chinese account reports an appeal to the Chinese emperor:

> Lately, the precious and strange (goods) brought by ocean-junks have mostly been taken to An-nan (the port of Hanoi) [probably Long-bien, north of modern Hanoi] to be traded there. I wish to send an officer to go to An-nan and close the market, and request that your imperial majesty send one central (government) official to accompany him.[36]

Champa's ports prospered from this shifting trade focus as well. As a result, Cham rulers were forced to come to terms with the new commercial presence. Immediately prior to the Canton turmoil of the late 750s, the Chams initiated a diplomatic relationship with China. The Cham ruler's increasing interest in trade

288–300]. Thai historians are now proposing a southern Thailand base, possibly Ligor, for Srivijaya's hegemony. (See M.C. Chand Chirayu Rajani, "Background to the Srivijaya Story".)

[32] The Chinese recognized Srivijaya's dominance over the Southern Seas until at least the 12th century (see Wolters, *Fall of Sri Vijaya*, p. 38), although Bennet Bronson has proposed that Srivijaya's hegemony was not constant but was intermittent, and probably the centre of Srivijaya's authority shifted several times during the period when the Chinese were recognizing its dominance (see Bennet Bronson, "Palembang as Srivijaya: The Lateness of Early Cities in Southern Southeast Asia").

[33] In the process of these raids, the Cham temples were said to have been desecrated, representing the destruction of the Cham king's legitimacy. As noted in the Po Nagar temple inscription recording these events, the temple's *linga* was carried off by the raiders, but was recovered by the Cham king who followed with his navy. Not only did the Cham king reinstall the *linga*, the symbol of his legitimacy, but he also used the loot he had acquired in defeating these marauding sea-farers to reconstruct the damaged temple (ISC, p. 252).

[34] See Bronson, op. cit.

[35] Quoted in Wang Gangwu, "The Nanhai Trade", p. 81. In addition, the foreign merchant community themselves compounded the situation by sacking Canton in 763.

[36] Quoted in ibid., p. 82. The Vietnamese ports were also subjected to similar raids during the 760s, indicative of their commercial importance in that age. See Coedes, *Making of Southeast Asia*, p. 79.

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is reflected when an official Cham mission was sent to China in 749, presenting the Chinese emperor with one hundred strings of pearls, gharuwood, cotton, and twenty tame elephants, all products which T'ang sources considered to be specialties of the Cham ports.[37] These ports, the Chinese records note, became transitory points between the Malay world and Annan and Canton; normally Cham traders used the An-nan port to acquire fine commodities such as Chinese silks and manufactured items.

After these eighth-century records, I have found little evidence of Champa's commercial stance until the eleventh century, when several inscriptions, as well as external information from China, allow me to speculate on Champa's attitude towards commerce.

Champa and International Commerce in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries

Tenth- and eleventh-century Cham history reflects an ongoing hostility between the Chams and the newly independent Vietnamese state to the north. An increasingly important ingredient of these hostilities was the use of naval warfare. Two major Cham naval campaigns, one in 979 and the second in 1042, had a significant impact upon the integrity of Cham hegemony.

In 979, a naval expedition attributed to the Chams was launched against the Vietnamese capital of Hoa-lu'.[38] In reply, the Vietnamese destroyed the Cham capital of Indrapura in 982, eventually forcing the Chams to move their capital further south to Vijaya (Binh-đinh). Cham raids against the Vietnamese coast in 1042 again brought retaliatory action. In 1044, Lý Thái-tông led a seaborne expedition which is said to have routed the Chams and killed their king Jaya Siṃhavarman II.[39] Shortly thereafter, in 1050, a Cham inscription records a royal expedition against the Cham port of Pānduranga. The people of this port are described as "vicious, threatening, and always in revolt against their sovereign", and they refused to recognize the Cham ruler's authority.[40]

Based on my study of the available records of this period, it is my impression that this final event is related to the two previous naval expeditions, and was the culmination of a commercial problem which the Cham rulers were facing during these centuries.

In considering the Cham-Vietnamese wars of the tenth and eleventh centuries, my attention was drawn to two kufic inscriptions, dating between 1029 and 1035, from Pāṇḍuranga (Phan-rang). These inscriptions evince the existence of a sizeable commercial group (possibly some three hundred strong) resident in Pāṇḍuranga.[41] One inscription records this community's selection of one of its members — a Muslim — as "agent of the bazaar", whose duty it was to represent local merchants and to protect their interests when dealing with Cham authorities. That earlier

[37] Ibid., pp. 90–91. T'ang records considered Cham ports to be a source of local products — ivory, rhinoceros horns, gharuwoods, tortoise-shells, amber, and manufactured gold and silver objects.

[38] The fleet was destroyed by a gale, and only the Cham king's vessel was spared. See Henri Maspero, "Le protectorat general d'Annam sous les T'ang", *BEFEO* 10 (1910): 678.

[39] Vijaya, the Cham capital, was taken, and 5,000 prisoners were carried back to the Lý domain, where they were resettled in new villages. See Coedes, *Making of Southeast Asia*, p. 83.

[40] Aymonier, op. cit., p. 29.

[41] Paul Ravaisse, "Deux inscriptions coufiques du Campa", *JA* 20, 2 (1922): 247–89.

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commercial groups had regularly interacted with the Cham monarchy is evident from a tenth-century Chinese reference to a 958 visit to China. On this visit, the ambassador of the Cham king Indravarman III presented the Chinese emperor rose water, flasks of "Greek fire", and precious stones.[42] Significantly, this official envoy of the Cham king was a Muslim named Abû Hasan (P'u Ho san). In 961, Abû Hasan is said to have returned to China bearing a letter from the new Cham king Jaya Indravarman I and presented fragrant wood, ivory, camphor, peacocks, and twenty Arab vases — all supposedly commercial products available in Cham ports — to the Chinese monarch.[43]

These Chinese references suggest that Cham monarchs were responsive to commercial activities during the mid-tenth century, such that they were able and willing to take advantage of the opportunities afforded when Canton was fully reopened to foreign commerce under the later Chou (951—959) and then the Sung (961—1280). I would posit, based on the eleventh-century kufic inscriptions, that Pāṇḍuranga was the Cham coast's major port in the mid-tenth century. Cham kings utilized a member of this community, Abû Hasan, to further the commercial relationships between this major Cham port, its merchant community dominated by Muslim merchants, and the reopening Chinese harbours.

The reason for such a positive response by the Cham ruler may well be stated in a later Sung reference to Champa's harbours, where the ships' cargoes were inspected by a king's agent upon arrival in port. After registering all commodities carried by a ship, and noting how many goods were unloaded, we are told that the king's agent collected one-fifth of each kind of commodity in the name of their monarch, then authorized the sale of the rest. All concealed freight was seized.[44] Income derived from commerce would have financed various royal activities, not the least of which were Cham ambitions for military conquest — especially against the north. Not only was the emerging Lý state a political rival but, from an economic perspective, the Ly ports were the Cham state's chief commercial rivals. The harbours of the Vietnamese coastal region, as noted above, had served as major centres for the China trade, while those of the Cham domain were of only secondary importance. In this light, it is possible to see the Cham-Vietnamese hostilities of the tenth and eleventh centuries as not only attempts at political expansion but also having commercial implications as well.[45]

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[42] Kodo Tasaka, "Islam in Champa", *Tohagaku* 4 (1952): 52.

[43] The dating of this second effort is significant, since it coincides with the investiture of the new Sung emperor. See Edward H. Schafer, *The Vermillion Bird* (Berkeley, 1967), p. 75, quoting the *Sung shih* and *Wu tai shih*.

[44] Maspero, op. cit., p. 29.

[45] It would be useful if one could turn to the Vietnamese chronicles for insight. John Whitmore and I have explored this possibility, but aside from receiving affirmation of the existence of urban centres, we have found all such references to the commercial centres of the North to be coloured by later Confucian historians and their general scepticism towards trade. While the Confucian overlay projects a negative attitude towards commerce, as yet limited archaeological evidence [see Jeremy H.C.S. Davidson, "Recent Archaeological Activity in Viet-Nam", *Journal of the Hong Kong Archaeological Society* 6 (1975): 80—99] as well as Chinese and other external references generally evince a positive commercial stance by the Lý rulers. The Vietnamese chronicles also provide little evidence on the Chams other than references to Champa as being a "country inhabited by monkeys" and a source of manpower. Wars with the Chams are reported, but there is little concern for Cham lifestyle. It is hoped that more detailed analysis by Hanoi historians may in the future provide further insight into these questions.

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There are two points of possible competition during these times: the port of Vǎn-đồn, in the northeast corner of the Red River delta at the Bach-đằng River mouth, was emerging as a prominent port and an interior trade route connecting Vietnam, and Angkor was also becoming important. This latter diversion may have been a serious threat to Cham trading, especially with Angkor. In an earlier article, I have plotted an eleventh-century overland trade route from the Vietnamese port of Nghệ-an west through the Ha-trai pass, travelling south down the Mekong into the Khmer heartland.[46] Traders specifically mentioned to be of Vietnamese origin are recorded in Khmer inscriptions, for example, in a 987 inscription from Phum Mien on the lower Mekong.[47] The presence of this Vietnamese trader in this lower Mekong area allows me to speculate on Pāṇḍuranga's strategic position *vis-a-vis* the Angkor domain. Pāṇḍuranga was located just north of the Mekong delta where it quite likely controlled much of the commercial traffic moving into the interior. The Vietnamese trader, I suggest, would normally have travelled to Phum Mien after first stopping at Pāṇḍuranga. The development of an alternative northern route overland from Vietnam would have significantly diverted trade from Cham ports and threatened their prosperity. Thus it was very much in the interest of the Cham commercial community to co-operate with the Cham rulers in their expeditions against the Vietnamese.

In support of this thesis, it is significant that the Cham had never been previously regarded as a naval power but as centres of piracy in earlier centuries.[48] It is my belief that the sources of tenth- and eleventh-century Cham maritime strength were similar to the people who in the eighth century had pillaged the Cham coast: that is, the "Malay" seafarers. A ninth-century Khmer inscription is of interest because of its reference to a victory over "thousands of barks with white sails", which George Coedès attributes to the Chams.[49] A Cham-Malay relationship is reflected in the increasing Javanese influence upon Cham culture. This influence is most visible in Cham temple architecture of the ninth century, notably at Mi-sơn, the temple complex of the Cham capital.[50] A Javanese inscription from this period makes specific reference to the activities of both Khmer and Cham merchants in Java.[51] This

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[46] Hall, "Khmer Commercial Development", p. 325. See also Henri Maspero, "La Frontiere de l'Annam et du Cambodge", *BEFEO* 18, 3 (1918): 29–36.

[47] George Coedès, *Inscription du Cambodge* 6 (Hanoi-Paris, 1942–66), pp. 183–86.

[48] Although, as I have noted, the Cham ruler used a naval force to recover the *liṅga* stolen from Po Nagar's temple during the 8th-century hostilities, Chinese records portray the Cham king as the leader of a land force of 5,000 who rode into the battle on elephants (Schafer, op. cit., p. 72, quoting the *T'ang shu*). It is likely that in the 8th century the Cham ruler was also utilizing the seafaring population of his coastal ports and that the Cham rulers' problems with the seafaring groups, as suggested below, pre-dated the 10th century.

[49] George Coedès, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu, 1968), p. 114. The inscription is reported in *ISC*, p. 492, fn. 3.

[50] See Philippe Stern, *L'art du Champa et son evolution*, (Paris, 1942), pp. 66–68, 109.

[51] A.M. Barrett, "Two Old Japanese Copper-plate Inscriptions of Balitung" (M.A. diss., University of Sydney, 1968), p. 129, as quoted in Jan Wisseman, "Markets and Trade in Pre-Islamic Java", p. 207. As discussed above, regional trade was shifting away from Sumatra to the Java Sea region in the 11th century, and that henceforth to gain access to the valuable spices of the eastern archipelago one had to deal directly with the Javanese. Thus it is not unreasonable to expect that the Javanese influence upon Cham cultural patterns may have been derived from Champa's participation in the channels of international trade. There are political implications as well, as past historians have attempted to reconstruct the 9th- and 10th-century history of the mainland as being a period of Javanese hegemony.

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Javanese contact no doubt equally attracted Malay traders and seafarers to the Cham ports. As noted, Southeast Asian seafarers through time have had a double potential of supporting trade by policing the channels of navigation and transporting commercial commodities, while in times of political chaos threatening to seek their livelihood by pirating the same seas they had once protected. I see the Cham monarchs directing the energies of these seafarers against the prosperous Vietnamese domain in 979 in an expedition which not only benefited the Cham state but improved the economic status of the Cham ports' commercial community as well.

Continuing hostilities between the Chams and the Vietnamese during the remainder of the century[52] diminished the powers of the Cham monarchy. The Cham capital at Indrapura was destroyed in the 982 raid, and the state's political control fragmented. Between 982 and 1050, as a result, the southern Cham domain, including the port of Pāṇḍuranga and its seafaring groups, became virtually autonomous. The two kufic inscriptions dating to this period, for instance, reflect the considerable autonomy of Pāṇḍuranga's merchant community. The "agent of the bazaar", as noted above, was charged with the task of protecting this autonomy from the Cham government's authorities.

It is likely that the final Cham naval expedition in 1042 again utilized Pāṇḍuranga's seafarers. In fact, based upon Sung records which clearly regard the Cham coast as a pirate lair,[53] it is quite possible that a number of the naval raids attributed to the Chams during this period were actually initiated by semi-autonomous sea nomads who used Cham ports as their base of operation. Finally, in 1044 the Lý seem to have had enough of this harassment and vented their wrath upon the Chams. In picking up the pieces, the new Cham king appears to have himself had enough of these semi-autonomous commercial groups, whom he described as "vicious, threatening, and always in revolt against their sovereign". Thus, in 1050, as part of his recentralizing activities, he restored central Cham authority over Pāṇḍuranga.[54]

The Po Nagar inscription recording the Cham king's expedition against Pāṇḍuranga notes that the Cham king symbolized the restoration of his authority over this southern

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In support of this thesis these historians have pointed to a Khmer inscription in which the Khmer king Jayavarman II (802–850) is said to have come from Java to reign over the Khmer domain and to have established his autonomy from Javanese control symbolically by throwing off his ties to the Javanese (Coedès, *Indianized States*, pp. 93, 97–98, 100).

[52] Coedès, *Indianized States*, pp. 125, 139–40.

[53] Maspero, op. cit., p. 29.

[54] In 1050, the Cham monarch was also expanding, or reestablishing, his power over the eastern Khmer border, sacking Sambupura on the Mekong, [See Milton Osborne, "Notes on Early Cambodian Provincial History: Isanapura and Sambhupura", *France/Asiae* 20, 4 (1966): 449]. Thus we may see the Cham king's expedition against Pāṇḍuranga as part of a general expansion of the Cham monarch's authority in 1050. I have speculated above on Pāṇḍuranga's strategic position relative to the route to Sambupura. Pāṇḍuranga, as noted, was located just north of the Mekong delta, where it would have controlled much of the traffic moving into the interior. In this instance, Pāṇḍuranga's conquest was a necessary predecessor to the Cham king's activities on the Mekong. As discussed in the article by Osborne, overland access to Sambupura was difficult. Thus it is reasonable to expect the Cham king to have launched his expedition up the Mekong from Pāṇḍuranga, and he may well have utilized the remnants of Pāṇḍuranga's maritime community, their loyalty newly restored, for this expedition of conquest. I may note my above reference to a similar Cham raid into the Khmer domain during the 9th century, when "thousands of barks with white sails" were repulsed by the Khmer monarch. In 1177, the Chams launched a devastating attack on Angkor, again using a naval force and going up the Mekong (Coedès, *Indianized States*, p. 164).

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port by rebuilding the Po Nagar temple complex and assigning "slaves" — Khmers, Chinese, men of Pukam (Pagan), and Thai (Syam) — to the temple. These "slaves", I suggest, were war captives who had formerly been residents of the cosmopolitan Pāṇḍuranga commercial community — former seafarers who had been captured by the Cham monarch in his expedition against their "pirate lair".[55]

As an aftermath to these activities, the Cham monarch sent three embassies to China between 1050 and 1056, and five to the Lý capital between 1047 and 1060.[56] This sudden flurry of diplomacy is best characterized as the Cham ruler's assurance to China and the Lý that he now had his domain, including Pāṇḍuranga and its marauding seafarers, firmly under control.

It is of interest in this perspective that the Chams launched a land attack against the Lý in 1068, and when Vietnam responded with a naval attack against Vijaya the Vietnamese found it remarkable that they met resistence only from a Cham army and not from a Cham fleet.[57] The reason for the absence of naval resistance, based on my historical reconstruction, was that the Cham king had diffused the old source of Cham naval support by his conquest of Pāṇḍuranga in 1050 and could no longer draw upon this community for his country's naval defense. The negative experiences the Cham rulers had had with the foreign merchants during the last century appear to have internalized the character of the Cham state. Thus in the next century's history, we find records of the Cham state's successful activities on the Southeast Asian mainland, but no reference in Cham epigraphy, nor in Chinese or Vietnamese sources, to the state's interaction with merchants and commerce.

Cham and Khmer Commercial Contacts in Perspective

John K. Whitmore, in a recently published paper,[58] charges the historian of pre-modern Southeast Asia to be aware of the ways in which commerce has penetrated the local scene in Southeast Asia. In his analysis, Whitmore proposes that Southeast Asia's participation in international commerce increased through time and also brought into the picture more participants. Is there, he questions, a desire for involvement?

In my brief analysis of the Khmer and Cham states of the tenth and eleventh centuries, I have attempted to answer Whitmore's question. I feel that in both instances although each is best characterized as an internally oriented wet-rice state, there was a desire for external commercial involvement by the states' monarchs. Both Angkor and Champa initially hoped to acquire a share of the profits to be derived from commerce. Each state's monarchs attempted to promote this expansion of their state's external commercial contacts via diplomatic means. This diplomacy

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[55] It was normal Southeast Asian practice to make dependents of one's enemies. I may cite, for example, my earlier reference to the Lý raid upon the Cham capital, when 5,000 war captives were transported back to the Lý capital and resettled. Such war captives were placed on the conquering state's lands where they contributed to the victorious state's economic prosperity. This resettlement pattern was consistent with the agricultural focus of the classical Southeast Asian state. I have hypothesized above that such resettlement of war captives was of great importance to the expansion of the Khmer state's agricultural base in the 10th and 11th centuries.

[56] Maspero, op. cit., pp. 138–39.

[57] Ibid., pp. 141–42.

[58] John K. Whitmore, "The Opening of Southeast Asia, Trading Patterns through the Centuries", *Economic Exchange*, pp. 139–53.

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featured official embassies and gifts to the monarchs of the Cōḻa, Chinese, and Vietnamese states — all participants in the international route. But while in the tenth and eleventh centuries the Khmer kings of Angkor experienced the benefits of their positive economic stance, we have seen that the Cham domain's interaction with the commercial channels proved disastrous.

The difference between the experiences of the two appears to have been determined by each state's internal strength. During the tenth century and the first half of the eleventh century, the Khmer state was successfully expanding both politically and economically. The construction of Angkor's *baray* and the resulting extension of agriculture, as well as the ability of the Angkor state to make even the most remote areas of its domain subject to Khmer administration, reflects significant capabilities. Champa's tenth- and eleventh-century history, on the other hand, is marked by critical fluctuations. Its geographic position on the coast, as opposed to Angkor's more protected position in the interior, seems to have contributed to Champa's vulnerability. Cham rulers not only solicited the aid of foreign merchants and seafarers as a source of an expanded economic prosperity but also utilized the merchants' navies for their coastal defences and expeditions of conquest. This relationship dictated that a strong leadership be provided by the Cham monarchy to keep these potentially disruptive forces in check. As I have noted, these maritime forces had traditionally assumed a double potential of either contributing to Southeast Asia's prosperity or bringing about general disruption. We have seen the positive aspects of one relationship with these sea nomads as reflected in the seeming commercial prosperity generated by the expansion of Cham trade with China during the period being considered, but likewise there was the threat such merchant groups posed to the integrity of the state when these groups were able to establish their autonomy from central Cham authority. To maintain his state's integrity and, as well, to demonstrate to the Vietnamese, Chinese, and his own subjects that he was quite capable of managing his domain, the Cham king intervened, taking decisive action to re-establish his firm control over Pāṇḍuranga.

The Cham relationship with the sea became a problem as early as the eighth century when the Cham coast was subjected to at least two naval attacks. The geographic position of Pāṇḍuranga in the south, far removed from the centre of Cham political authority in Indrapura and later Vijaya, was no doubt ideal from the Cham monarch's point of view. Soon after the Chinese had "opened" Champa to commerce, Champa's commercial centres shifted south, away from the capital. In the south, potentially dangerous commercial groups and foreigners could be kept isolated, far removed from the Cham state's centre of authority in the north. There these foreigners could harm neither the Cham treasury nor the state's central cult of legitimacy.

A general negative attitude towards merchants is well conveyed in Cham epigraphy through its silence. Nowhere, for example, have I found reference in a Cham inscription to a merchant. People who came from the sea, which would have included merchants, are described in Cham epigraphy as "black", "demonic", and "vicious", and were considered a threat to Cham civilization. The Cham appear to have been overly conscious of status distinctions. Edward Schafer has proposed that the Cham aristocracy was clearly defined: aristocrats, he posits, were Hindu, commoners became Mahayana Buddhists, and merchants were Muslims.[59] It is thus to be expected that

[59] Schafer, op. cit., p. 76.

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

merchants, being both Muslim and bad, would have received no mention in the temples of the Cham aristocrats.[60] In the Khmer domain, likewise, I have found few references to merchants except during Sūryavarman I's reign, a period when the Khmer state seems to have been more interested in encouraging commercial relationships.

These attitudes towards merchants are consistent with the classical form of Southeast Asian statecraft. In the examples of Angkor and Champa cited above, we have seen centre-oriented wet-rice states which drew in the resources of their realm. My focus has been on each state's interest in attracting commercially generated revenues to the state's centre, and in the case of Champa, naval manpower for the use of the king as well. To acquire the resources necessary for a state's ruler to expand his state's normal economic base, whether through the construction of irrigation networks to allow the extension of agriculture or by the development of his state's commercial economy. While this participation in commercial affairs appears to have been of secondary interest to Angkor's rulers, in the case of Champa we may see a state which became, owing to its geographic position, caught up in the international channels of Asian maritime trade. Champa found it difficult to maintain its control over the foreign commercial element, which at first was regarded as an asset to the state and its ambitions, and in the end endured the consequences.

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[60] My research on epigraphy from other areas of Asia has convinced me that this attitude towards merchants was not characteristic of the Chams alone, but was a general attitude of agrarian states which were synthesizing Indic and Sinic cultural values. For example, see Kenneth R. Hall, *Local Commerce, Itinerant Trade, and South Indian Statecraft in Cōḻa Times*, forthcoming.

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