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"Elephants Can Actually Swim": Contemporary Chinese Views of Late Ly Dai Viet

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A major confusion that exists in general writing on Vietnamese history concerns the nature of state and society in the Lý period (1010-1225). The assumption is often made that the millenium of Chinese domination (usually seen as dating from 111 B.C. to A.D. 939) had such a profound effect on the Vietnamese that all aspects of their civilization must be seen in a Chinese light. We would thus expect to find in Vietnam a bureaucratized, Confucian state with a strong central control and a people organized in patrilineal and strongly patriarchal clans. In this same way, we would also expect to see a major "faultline" (in the term used at this conference) existing between Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia, a cultural break so complete that the peoples on both sides of the line would have almost nothing in common with each other and be culturally, if not racially, antagonistic.

Yet evidence from both within Vietnam and without may lead the historian who studies Vietnam in the first centuries of its independence to a differing conclusion. By approaching the Vietnamese of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in a manner similar to the study of other parts of Southeast Asia at the same time, the historian can gain a better sense of the relative closeness or distance between Đại Việt and its contemporary Southeast Asian kingdoms. Keith W. Taylor elsewhere in this volume uses Vietnamese sources to look at the eleventh century and the establishment of Lý power; here I use contemporary Chinese sources in combination with Vietnamese materials to take a glance at the late twelfth century and the decline of the Lý.

In addition, the work of O.W. Wolters is of great value to this study in three specific ways. First, his use of Chinese sources for the study of Southeast Asian history demonstrates how such external information may help to provide a pattern for the study of individual Southeast Asian peoples. Second, his study of the nature of early Southeast Asian leadership points the way for our examination of indigenous political events. And, most specifically, his work on the Trần period and its view of the preceding Lý has provided a critical ingredient for the study of the end of the Lý and the beginning of the Trần.

Wolters' major use of Chinese sources is well known. His integration of foreign and indigenous detail demonstrated the approach necessary for the reconstruction of local Southeast Asian history, where

possible. Most recently, he has published an article pointing to the possibility of finding valuable information on internal Southeast Asian situations scattered about in Chinese "notebooks" (**pi-chi**).[1] These random "jottings" are likely to contain data of great interest when placed within the historical context as we now know it. Once dug out of the Chinese texts, such information with its observation of Southeast Asian life of the time will greatly enhance our developing knowledge of the political, social, economic and cultural patterns within Southeast Asia. For certain periods in Vietnamese history, the late Lý being one and the Mạc era of the sixteenth century being another, such material is of great importance for our interpretation.

Another direction in which Wolters' work has taken him is the analysis of leadership on the early Southeast Asian political scene. The non-structured nature of such political activities required strong personal qualities of leadership and the demonstration of exceptional individual abilities. The charisma of such individuals showed their link to supernatural powers and their sharing of qualities considered extramundane. Successors of such exceptional individuals attempted to maintain such status through ritual contacts and the ceremonial binding of followers to them. For Wolters, prowess formed a central ingredient in achieving overlordship.[2] Special qualities and accomplishments, particularly in warfare, set a leader off and insured followers in his wake. Personal achievement, not unlike success in headhunting, brought glory, both secular and sacred, momentum, and an aura of continuing success. Individuals would flock to serve and devote themselves to such a personage. Physical and spiritual power were thus strongly intertwined. Success meant **śakti** and **śakti** meant more success.

Such successful leaders sought to link themselves directly to spiritual powers. In seventh-century Cambodia, this took the form of a cult to Siva which eventually led to the devaraja cult. As Ian Mabbett and Hermann Kulke have shown,[3] the ruler was thus seen to be "like a god". With such demonstrated efficacy and sharing in the Hindu-Buddhist cosmos, such a leader drew to himself powerful families and took wives from them. All followers gained both earthly and spiritual benefits as they supported this man of prowess. Once he left the scene, his successors sought to keep his position by maintaining the ritual which had linked him to the spiritual powers. Individual prowess became religious acts through which later leaders took on the accomplishments of their forebear.

Concerning specifically Vietnam and the late Lý period, Wolters has helped set both the historical and the historiographical contexts for our understanding of these unexamined years. His studies of the late thirteenth-century Vietnamese historian Lê Văn Hưu have shown the concerns of the early Trần dynasty and its view of the Lý in the previous century.[4] A prime worry for the Trần and a weak point (in their view) of the Lý was succession to the throne. Picking up on his theme of Southeast Asian leadership noted above, Wolters pointed to "the heroic quality of the individual" which drew followers, achieved overlordship and linked itself to supernatural power.[5] A network of families interlocked with the leader by marriage provided support for his efforts, but meant competing factions upon his death. Eventually, with the establishment and growth of the Lý court, those in royal service also came to have a hand in succession disputes as well. In

addition, the scholars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries did not, in the Trần eyes, act to establish the Lý court as it ought to have been established. The Trần themselves took advantage of such weaknesses and acted to resolve them in the thirteenth century.

We may now turn to the late Lý period, particularly the second half of the twelfth century. Taylor's work sets the foundation for the study of the Lý, and Wolters has begun the study of the Trần and their activities in the thirteenth century. I first examine some contemporary Chinese sources of the sort discussed above which bear directly on the state immediately to the south. I then look at the significant Chinese details in conjunction with the Vietnamese records in order to discuss the nature of Đại Việt in these years.

I. Chinese Reports

Two rather long statements on Vietnam exist from the last quarter of the twelfth century and one short one from the first quarter of the thirteenth, all three falling under the general classification **pi-chi**. Fan Shih-hu's **Kuei Hai Yu Heng Chih** (1170s) is not completely extant, but a long section of it is included in Ma Tuan-lin's chapter on "Chiao-chih" from his late thirteenth-century encyclopedic work, **Wen Hsien T'ung K'ao**. Fan's work is referred to by Chou Ch'u-fei in the latter's **Ling Wai Tai Ta** (1178) which has a long section on "An-nan Kuo". Finally, Chao Ju-kua's **Chu Fan Chih** (1225) has a short section on "Chiao-chih".[6] The writings from the 1170s are both offered from the vantage point of Kuangsi province, just north of the Vietnam border. Fan Shih-hu (also known as Fan Ch'eng-ta) was named High Commissioner for Kuei-lin early in 1174, while Chou Ch'u-fei served as Assistant Sub-prefect under Fan and another official in the mid-1170s (ca. 1172-1178). Chao Ju-kua offers a coastal view rather than an inland one from his post as Superintendent of Maritime Trade in Fu-chien province at Ch'uan-chou on the southeast coast of China.[7]

Let us start with Fan Shih-hu's report and then make comparative comments based on that of Chou Ch'u-fei which cites Fan's work. We shall also see what Chao Ju-kua's somewhat different perspective and later time adds to the discussion.

One major point to be made from the late twelfth-century reports, duly noted by Fan, is the contrast between contemporary Vietnam and the Vietnam reported by the early Sung ambassador of almost two centuries before. Sung Hao had informed his emperor (Sung T'ai-tsung) in 990 that the Vietnamese were **hua-oai** "beyond civilization" (and Fan concurred). The Vietnamese capital had been outside the Red River delta at Hoa-lủ, essentially the armed camp of the local warlord Lê Hoàn. Hoàn had taken the title **ĐẾ** "Emperor", tattooed the phrase **Thiên-tử-binh** "Army of the Son of Heaven" on the foreheads of his troops, and used Chinese names and titles for his court, but was (in Chinese eyes) much too close to his followers.[8] The Vietnamese polity, as reflected in Sung's report, was based on personal loyalty to a dominant leader. The soldiers with their tattoos and faithful courtiers surrounded a ruler who sought to raise himself to the level of the Chinese emperor. Kinship and personal favor were the bases for selection of officers, with all the instability inherent therein. Punishment was severe for the slightest error. Martial display took on a major role, and all men were ultimately part of the armed forces. Sung Hao portrayed such activity as mere vanity;

for the Vietnamese, it was a most necessary element in a polity based on a combination of indigenous beliefs, military power and Chinese overlay.

The impact of Sung's impressions remained with the Chinese for eighty years. In the 1070s, the Sung dynasty had still maintained the underdeveloped image of the Vietnamese and had had to alter it when the Vietnamese demonstrated an efficient military capacity during the fighting of that decade. Fan Shih-hu observed that while the Vietnamese had most definitely been *hoa-oai*, with the shock of their advanced power in the warfare of the 1070s (despite Fan's protestations of victory) he judged Đại Việt to be currently "the most powerful of all the southern barbarians".[9] Though Fan showed only a bare awareness of the bloody struggle, conflicts during the twelfth century on the eastern mainland among the Khmer, the Chams and the Vietnamese led the latter to seek the assurance of stability in their rear. (Fan's one mention was of territory valuable for aromatic woods which the Vietnamese had taken from the Khmer.)[10] The China with which the Vietnamese were seeking good relations now lay much closer to them than ever before, with the Southern Sung capital in the lower Yangtze valley after 1126. Wolters has noted how the Lý king "mounted a number of lavish missions in order to improve his status in the Chinese court, and in 1174 his efforts were rewarded by the bestowal of the title 'King of An-nan'".[11]

These efforts led to a flurry of diplomatic activity between Vietnam and China. Initially, the Vietnamese sought contact and were rebuffed, only to have the Chinese ask for elephants (to be used for the great sacrifice to Heaven). This time it was the Vietnamese who resolutely refused, being reluctant to let the animals go. In 1174, just as Fan was taking over his duties in Kuangsi, the Vietnamese again tried to make contact, while still refusing to send the elephants. With both sides adamant, Fan himself helped resolve the situation - the Chinese agreed to accept the full Vietnamese tribute and the Vietnamese brought fifteen elephants, all bedecked (for an illustration of such, see Guy in this volume). The Vietnamese ruler in turn was declared to be **An Nan Kuo Wang** "King of the State of An-nan". However, as this entire procedure was taking place, another complication occurred. The Vietnamese ruler (Lý Anh-tông) died, and the Prime Minister Tô Hiến Thành placed his successor (Lý Cao-tông) on the throne. The Vietnamese then proceeded to accept the Chinese recognition without mentioning that the old king was deceased. The situation was finally resolved, however, and the Chinese sent both their condolences and the official bestowal of the new title on the new ruler. Throughout the entire time, a number of embassies, both Vietnamese and Chinese, moved through Kuei-lin on their way to the other's capital. Both Fan and Chou served there at the time, and it is from their contacts with the embassies going and coming that their information comes. Each official has something to offer as an independent observer. [12]

According to Fan (and as we shall see below), the Vietnamese used the title **An Nan Tu Hu Fu** (Viet. **An Nam Đô Hộ Phủ**) "Protectorate of An-nan". Fan himself made special note of the fact that he was able to take advantage of the title by receiving the Vietnamese envoys as a group of lower Chinese officials, equal to his own junior officials, rather than as members of a tributary embassy. The Vietnamese, needing the Chinese contact, complied and offered no complaint. In addition, where the official seal of Đại Việt had read **Nam Việt Quốc Âm** "Seal of

the State of Nan Yueh", Fan tells us that it had "recently" been changed to **Chung Shu Men Hsia Chih Yin** "Seal of the [Chinese] Secretariat and Chancellory". This change may have occurred as a result of the new title just received (and only for the benefit of the Chinese?). **Nan-yueh** was undoubtedly a term which disturbed the Chinese court. On their side, according to Fan, the Chinese did not take issue with the Vietnamese use of Chinese titles due to the reluctance of the Chinese to upset relations with such a border state (Vietnam was, after all, the only state in Southeast Asia to maintain relations with the Southern Sung throughout the latter's existence).[13]

The diplomatic front thrown up by the Vietnamese before Fan and the Chinese seems to have been centered (as we will note below) in the **An-nam Đô Hộ Phủ** or Protectorate Office and involved some Chinese scholars, as an annoyed Fan pointed out. The Vietnamese diplomats undoubtedly consisted of a small group of courtiers and officials schooled in the Chinese classics, and this would help to explain Fan's statement that officials selected by examination were the most respected in the Vietnamese court. No evidence exists for such a statement in the Vietnamese records. Nevertheless, Fan is certainly correct in listing the items the Vietnamese had brought from China - the literacy, palace names, official titles, as well as other things like paper and writing brushes. In this way Fan attempted to show the Vietnamese dependence on Chinese goods and immigrants, both voluntary and forced, for the foundation of their civilization. Indeed, he even went so far as to claim that a majority of the population of Vietnam had come from China. In making his case that the Sung should try harder to maintain and not ignore their tight restrictions on slave trafficking and the foreign employ of Chinese literati, Fan sensationalized his presentation as he tried to bring the problem (and himself) to the attention of his emperor. In Fan's view, the territory of Min (Fu-chien) supplied the necessary brains for the operation of the Vietnamese state. While he turns out to have been prophetic, given the rise of the Trần in the following century, Fan even makes the statement, "according to tradition", that it was the home of the dynastic founder, Lý Công Uẩn.[14]

A major point being implicitly made by Fan was that Vietnam was a point of connection between "infamous traffickers from the southern part of the empire" and "foreign merchants belonging to barbarian lands". Fan charges the two sets of traders with complicity in shipping both human beings and Sung copper cash overseas, in addition to the regular commerce. The Vietnamese, he noted, used the copper cash for their currency, not making their own (not knowing how, he says). The goods of the country included metals from their own mines (gold, silver, copper), pearls, and animal products (from elephants, rhinoceroses, kingfishers) as the most valuable of a number of items, and the Vietnamese were in contact with "all the southern barbarians (**Man**) to the west of the Chinese ports". The closest of the Chinese ports was only a day away by sea.[15]

Yet behind the facade of real or imagined Chinese influence lay quite a different world, as Fan himself shows us. His work gives us much important detail about Vietnamese life. Đại Việt was, as Fan indicates, quite willing to supplement its manpower and human resources with additions from elsewhere, to treat newcomers well, and to use their expertise to settle relevant problems, particularly in the international

sphere (as in the composition of letters). Hence Fan's vivid allegations of extensive trade in human beings and of the reception of anyone able and interested in serving the Vietnamese throne (Confucian scholars, Buddhist monks and other religious figures, merchants, skilled artisans and their dependants) all have a ring of truth despite any exaggeration he may have given them. The system into which the Vietnamese welcomed these foreigners showed little correspondence to the bureaucratic pattern of Sung government. Despite their "false" use of Chinese official titles, especially those linked to the Protectorate (**Đô Hộ Phủ**), Fan specifically states that the Vietnamese did not use a bureaucratic ranking.[16]

The Vietnamese government instead was organized around the royal clan (**Vương-tông-tộc**) and the capital of Thăng-long. The royal clan was divided between those in a direct line to the throne (**thừa-tự**) and those in an indirect line (**chi-tự**). Especially favored courtiers were attached to the royal clan, presumably being given the royal name (**Lý**). Other courtiers were grouped together as the Company of the Heavenly King (**Thiên-vương-ban**). The officials were split between the "inner" **nội** and the "outer" **ngoại**, with the former "administering the people" and the latter "running the army". In the capital, there thus existed the ruling elite with their Chinese aristocratic titles headed by the Prime Minister **Phụ Quốc Thái Úy** and assisted by an assortment of administrative positions. The outer territories were handled by the military under the guidance of the top counsellor (**Khu-mật-sự**). In addition, the "outer" sphere included the office of the Protectorate (**Đô Hộ Phủ**) which had its own building in the royal compound, a tower. Men became officials in one of three ways - by examination (as noted above, the preferred way in Fan's eyes), by being the son of an official or by wealth. The latter means received more detailed description than the other two. The officials were provided with no cash salary as they were expected to live off the rice and fish obtained from the local populace. On the other hand, the Vietnamese troops (still wearing the tattoo "Army of the Son of Heaven" on their foreheads) received money, cloth and rice, even while they worked their fields in times of peace.[17]

Other information supplied by Fan shows the cultural context of the times for the Vietnamese. While his statement that the Vietnamese "had little comprehension of (Chinese classical) literature" was undoubtedly meant to be deprecating, it was in general most likely quite true. Vietnamese society was not a strong reflection of China's, and its indigenous patterns were still quite visible. Bamboo was everywhere, tattooing was prominent, both for soldiers and for "slaves", and betel chewing was certainly there. The Vietnamese ceremonies had a distinct orientation toward fertility rather than the ancestors (as Fan noted, the ceremonies "of the different seasons of the year make no offerings to the ancestors"). At the beginning of the year, the Vietnamese ruler (referred to by Fan as the **tu** or chief) slaughtered a buffalo, no doubt tied to a tall pole, and gave a feast for his courtiers. At mid-year, there was a great celebration during which the officials presented domestic animals to their ruler who in turn on the following day gave a feast for them. The palaces, carrying the "falsely arrogated titles" of Crystal (**Thủy-tinh-cung**) and Origin of Heaven (**Thiên-nguyên-điện**), were richly decorated with "dragons" (water spirits), cranes (with the power to keep serpents away), and heavenly nymphs.[18]

Among the ordinary people, all of whom put up their hair and went barefoot according to Fan, the standard fare was "Cham rice", **Chiêm-mễ**. This type was, to quote the modern historian Ho P'ing-ti, "an early ripening and relatively drought resistant rice from Champa" which had been introduced into China as well.[19] The favored rice, however, was called **Đại-hòa** and was saved for special occasions such as the New Year. The soldiers received a dish of it combined with fish paste (perhaps **nước mắm**, the fermented fish sauce of the Vietnamese). The people were not separated from their ruler by a layered bureaucratic structure. Anyone who wished to make an appeal to the throne concerning a complaint or judgement that required immediate attention could ring the great bell hanging at the gate to the royal palace. The punishments handed out, Fan tells us, were quite harsh.[20]

Chou Ch'u-fei incorporated much of his superior's information in his own account, and the two works not surprisingly overlap. Yet each in places has more detail than the other, showing that each stood in his own right as an observer. A detailed comparison of the two essays would be quite valuable. However, for now we shall compare only those segments of greatest value for studying Đại Việt itself. For Chou, Vietnam's arrogance began with Lý Thánh-tông in the mid-eleventh century when the Vietnamese ruler "falsely" bestowed posthumous titles on his ancestors, named the country Đại Việt, and took the reign title **Thiên-huống** "Heaven confers (this on us)". Yet, Chou tells us, however rustic the Vietnamese court may have appeared, the upper and lower levels got along rather well. Undoubtedly to his dismay, both the king's mother and his wife were called "Queen", and all his sons were potential heirs apparent (similar to Fan, but told in a different way). The Vietnamese differentiated between the immediate royal clan (called by Chou **Đại-vương**) and the branch clans which had more distant claims to the throne. But Chou explicitly states that "the eldest in the (royal) clan is called the heir apparent (**thừa-tự**)". Chou too notes the inner/outer, civil/military distinction without going into as much detail. He is more explicit on the nature of the Protectorate Office - it handled correspondence and relations with China. Like Fan, Chou notes the three means of joining the state administration, being the son of an official, being chosen for scholarship (without directly saying examinations), or possessing wealth. But elsewhere he too claimed examinations to be the major means of selecting officials. As for the provincial administrative organization, Chou listed what he called four prefectures (**phủ**), thirteen subprefectures (**châu**), and three stations (**trại**). His list is incomplete though, missing as it does some inland administrative units.[21]

In describing the life and times of the Vietnamese, Chou does not reach for the sensationalism of Fan (as for example with the slave trade). Where he utilizes the same information as Fan, Chou tends to follow the more matter-of-fact detail, rearranging it within his narrative. His description of food, clothing and decorative items generally follows Fan's. Yet Chou is quite capable of making independent observations, such as: "Elephants can actually swim" and "The tattooing on their bodies resembles the designs on the bronze drums".[22]

Chao Ju-kua wrote almost half a century later and his note on Chiao-chih draws from the Fan and Chou accounts. Thus, we hear (in shorthand) once again of the Vietnamese going barefoot, not using

medicines, needing to import Chinese paper and writing brushes and having two major festivals. "On New Year's day they pray to the Buddha, but they do not make presents to their ancestors". The Vietnamese products listed by Chao are the same as in Fan's report, but curiously enough Chao states that "this country does not participate in the foreign trade (of China)".[23]

II. The Early Vietnamese State

As we examine these Chinese *pi-chi* in our study of late Lý Vietnam, we need to keep in mind what we know of the early Vietnamese and integrate elements of the Chinese notes into our understanding. I shall start with a key element in Vietnamese civilization which still requires further investigation, social structure, and then using Wolters' thought on Southeast Asian leadership look at religious elements in Vietnamese kingship to see how Vietnamese society and kingship were interrelated. From there, I shall examine Vietnamese administrative organization and finally economic life as it related to the state. I shall conclude with some comments on how these points relate to the dynastic change which took place a half century later. In the process, I shall utilize the major indigenous historical texts on the times, both from the following Trần dynasty: Lê Văn Hữu's *Đại Việt Sử Ký* and the (*Đại*) *Việt Sử Lược*. [24]

A. Social structure

In another paper I have discussed the pattern of Vietnamese social organization for a later period.[25] Using the very informative work of Yu Insun,[26] it becomes quite apparent that earlier Vietnamese society was not patrilineal in the Chinese sense. Only with the Lê dynasty of the fifteenth century and after was there an official emphasis by the central government for the people at large on patrilineality and primogeniture. An analysis of earlier Vietnamese social organization requires, to my mind, a sense of social structure elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

As Wolters notes, lowland Southeast Asian society was generally cognatic with the consequent necessity of voluntary group formation. Cooperative effort and creative leadership were important elements in social organization. The Balinese studies of Clifford and Hildred Geertz and James Boon, the Burmese work of Melford Spiro, and the Thai research of Jeremy Kemp bring out the optional nature of social relationships in these societies.[27] The broad kindred encompassing both paternal and maternal lines meant choice instead of requirement in kin relations (and beyond). Thus, a key word in describing such relationships is flexibility, particularly in terms of group formation.

A. Thomas Kirsch has pointed out the significance of bilateral relations for early Southeast Asian polities, and Wolters applied Kirsch's discussion to mid-Lý Vietnam in the same volume.[28] The main point was that pretenders to power needed allies: intermarriage with families of other powerful leaders helped attain this. Yet all offspring of such marriages had claims to the throne, and their maternal grandparents were quite willing to wade into the fray in order to strengthen that claim.

In this volume, Vickery indicates the response to this problem

by early Angkor. The Khmer developed the pattern of a conical clan (not patrilineal but "ambilateral") in order to regulate the succession, a pattern with much potential instability. In Đại Việt, as Wolters pointed out in the discussion at the conference,[29] the choice was one of "dynasty", applying a patrilineal scheme to royal succession. The result, in his view, was that it controlled the royal women and their families, maintained a sense of the past in the court, and provided a continuity of service therein. This concept started under the Lý and only reached full force with their successors, the Trần, who recognized the problems in the Lý approach to succession.[30]

Let us look first at Keith Taylor's comments on Vietnamese social structure before the Lý and during the period of Chinese domination.[31] He sees therein a society with a bilateral nature and flexible tendencies. Mythic outlines in the Lạc period over a thousand years before indicate that there were a relatively high position for women in Vietnamese society and "a bilateral family system in which inheritance rights could be passed through both maternal and paternal lines". Later historical events confirm such a pattern, and the Chinese were ultimately frustrated in their efforts to make Vietnamese society over in their own image. Wolters shows how, as a result of the flexibility inherent in Vietnamese social structure, almost all the successions of the Lý dynasty had some problems attached to them. There was no primogeniture or any set form of succession to the throne. The result was that all elements in and around the court could attempt to share in the choice of the new ruler. The flexibility thus helped bring disorder and danger to the court and, to some degree, the state itself.

What do the above *pi-chi* tell us about Vietnamese social structure and particularly the organization of the court and the state? Both Fan and Chou indicate the openness of the succession to all the sons of the king, though Chou also speaks of "the eldest of the royal clan" being the heir apparent. He indicates as well the equality of Queen Mother and Queen, and hence of the potential of their respective families to involve themselves around the throne. Other branches of the royal family also had access to the throne. This would confirm the picture of succession drawn by Wolters from the Vietnamese sources.

Another point made by Fan was that privileged members of the aristocracy would be drawn into the royal clan (and perhaps given the royal name). To me, this represents both the fluidity of kin relations in Vietnam and the use of fictive kin relations to strengthen group formation and political alliances. This is a pattern that would continue in later centuries (as witness the bestowal of the Lê name on loyal followers in the fifteenth century until Lê Thánh-tông brought in Confucian objections to such a practice).

B. Ritual

The fluidity of Southeast Asian and Vietnamese social organization required, in Wolters' terms (as noted earlier), "an acknowledgement of the heroic quality of an individual".[32] This inspired loyalty which helped form groups and the political power these entailed. However, once a powerful individual had gained the throne and established his family thereon, the problem of royal succession emerged as Wolters has described. Ritual had to be developed which would continue the special heroic qualities of the ruler, particularly as it concerned perceived

links with the supernatural. This need tied in with the need of the central power to establish itself over the local powers and their cults. The answer, I would argue, for Vietnam as for other classical states of Southeast Asia was the cosmic umbrella of Hindu-Buddhist thought and a strong eclecticism in their approach to foreign ideas.[33]

More specifically, of importance here was the role of Indra, King of Heaven/the Gods, allowing the parallelism between microcosmos and macrocosmos, king and god, maintaining social order, and bringing prosperity and fertility to the land. Michael Aung Thwin and Eleanor Mannikka have shown the major significance of Indra for Pagan and Angkor respectively.[34] In both cases, the nature of kingship had a strong link to Indra in symbol and ritual, most notably in the **abhiseka** ceremony. Indra also existed in Thăng-long, capital of Đại Việt, in the form of **Đế-thích** (the **Ti-shih** of China). Established in 1057 by Lý Thánh-tông, the ritual concerning this figure continued through the Lý and Trần dynasties, only to be displaced during the rise of the Confucian state in the fifteenth century; yet it reappeared briefly in 1516 with the attempt to resurrect the Trần dynasty, an apparent local reaction to the adoption of the Chinese model.[35]

Linked to and scattered around the name of **Đế-thích** in the Vietnamese historical texts (and the **pi-chi** as well) is frequent mention of the word **Thiên** "Heaven", used in the nomenclature of reigns, rituals, temples and places. This term is Chinese and is usually seen in Vietnam as relating to the impersonal Confucian Heaven with its strong moral overtones. Yet in the earlier centuries I suspect that **Thiên** relates more to the Hindu-Buddhist Heaven than to the Confucian moral one. Vietnam must be, I am arguing here, considered within a Southeast Asian context on this issue. The existence in Đại Việt of a Hindu-Buddhist royal cult of Indra, the Heavenly King, links the earthly king to the celestial and creates a positive and reinforcing relationship between monarchy and populace. In this manner would the successors to the dynastic founder be able both to maintain the heroic image he set and to establish a royal cult overarching the local cults.

Fan notes one fact of particular significance for this argument. Members of the Vietnamese aristocracy were brought into the royal clan and/or into the Company of the King of Heaven (**Thiên-vương-ban**). I interpret this "company" to have been a distinguished group of Vietnamese courtiers who participated in the ritual surrounding the cult of **Đế-thích**. By doing so, they would have maintained the central existence of dynastic continuity and upheld the heroic image/cosmic configuration of the Vietnamese ruler. The Vietnamese historical records show the activities of this cult through the twelfth century. Both Lê Văn Hưu's **Đại Việt Sử Ký** and the (**Đại**) **Việt Sử Lược** record the 1057 founding of the cults to **Đế-thích** (Indra) and **Phạm-vương** (Brahma) in the **Thiên-phúc** and **Thiên-thọ** temples. The images of the two deities were cast in gold. The **Đại Việt Sử Ký** then notes a visit of the king to the image of **Đế-thích** alone in 1134 (linked to the establishment of the **Thiên-ninh** and **Thiên-thành** temples), while the (**Đại**) **Việt Sử Lược** recorded the gilding of the two images and the placing of them in the two temples of **Thiên-phù** and **Thiên-hựu** in 1158 and again in 1194.[36] Lê Tắc would record (in his **An-nam Chí-lược** of the early fourteenth century) that the ritual involving **Đế-thích** took place two days before the New Year's.[37]

Another ritual of more down-to-earth significance for the

Vietnamese was the oath of allegiance. Begun in 1028 with the first Lý succession, it would continue through the Lý and Trần dynasties into the Lê before being displaced by the Nam-giao sacrifice to the Confucian Heaven.[38] As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese oath involved imbibing a sacralized liquid, here the blood of a sacrificial animal, and calling upon the spirit(s) to destroy them if they should prove to be disloyal. The Vietnamese oath was taken to the Spirit of the Mountain of the Bronze Drum. We see the oath of allegiance taken in twelfth-century Đại Việt at times of dynastic succession, in 1128, 1137 and 1175. Later, in the tumultuous last years of the dynasty, the oath appeared twice in 1214 and then in 1225 when the Lý princess took the throne.[39] During the Trần dynasty, the oath ceremony was held regularly on the fourth day of the fourth month, and it is possible that the oath formed an annual rite in the Lý court as well. Fan and Chou both note the major celebration after the New Year (the fourth day of the first month) at which the Lý ruler had a buffalo slaughtered and gave a feast for his ministers. This could have been the occasion for taking such a blood oath.

C. Administration

The form of the state that emerged in the Red River delta with the Lý dynasty was eclectic, elitist and non-bureaucratic in a pattern similar to those of the other great Southeast Asian states of the classical age. In all these states, the major focus of activity was in the central base around the capital, that area which served as the foundation of the ruling family. Here were concentrated the power and the resources, economic, religious and intellectual, controlled by the state with trusted lieutenants in charge. Religious establishments and their estates seem to have formed a key part of this area. The state, then, was centralized in the sense that as much as possible of what the state controlled tended to be brought into this core area.

De Casparis, Jacques, Vickery and Kulke in this volume have shown the nature of administration in the classical state of Southeast Asia, of the relations between capital and countryside therein. Focussing mainly on Cambodia and Java, these essays show us how, from the seventh century on, polities gradually coalesced until ca. A.D. 1000 they formed (in Kulke's words) an "imperial phase of state formation in Southeast Asia". Operating from a strengthened core area, the rulers of such polities either placed kin and favored lieutenants in charge of outer areas or invested local leaders in their existing positions. As Wolters has noted, "Administrative power ... depended on the management of personal relationships ...".[40] Such individuals could act with relative autonomy as long as they took part in the ritual of the court (such as the oath) and furnished resources to the capital. The village communities scattered about the countryside stayed within their own frames of reference except in times of emergency or of specific royal demands. Only then would they interact with the central power. Otherwise they sent some of their resources to the local lord, who in turn forwarded a share as tribute to the throne. In Đại Việt, there was a similar pattern. Taylor in this volume utilizes the work of Yumio Sakurai to demonstrate that the Lý controlled the core area directly and the outer area indirectly and that the polity which existed was "a system of regional powers grouped under the Lý royal umbrella". As

Taylor demonstrates so well, the Vietnamese ruler integrated the realm through personal contact with both the human and the supernatural beings of the varied localities.

Kulke also notes the use of religious institutions (temples) as a key element in the integration of the expanded core area. We know that many temples were built in the region around Thăng-long during the early Lý. Kulke's description would seem to fit Đại Việt, but more specific work needs to be done on this topic in the Vietnamese sources.

Wolters has pointed out the **mandala** nature of politics in Southeast Asia,[41] and we should apply this concept to Vietnam as well. The many circles of local political power lay both within and outside the larger circle of a great capital's political influence. Hence, as Wolters and Taylor (in this volume) note, there was little distinction between domestic and foreign relations. Both situations required the personal contacts noted above. Such relations also meant "non-exclusive" approaches (to use Taylor's term) irrespective of what we might see as ethnicity or ideology. This cultural relativity meant that what counted was not what people were or believed, but rather what power relations existed among them, and in a world of **mandalas** these power relations were constantly shifting. For Đại Việt, this involved positive relations with other peoples and their cultures and an uneasiness concerning the attraction of other power centers for the people in their own outer areas. Taylor points out the need to attack rival capitals in order to keep control over one's own sphere of influence.

The elite which ruled the Vietnamese state carried titles of the T'ang aristocracy. Living in the capital region, these courtiers added to its might and glory, thereby contributing both to the cultural magnetism which attracted outlying principalities and to the power which controlled them. As Fan noted, a bureaucracy in the Chinese sense was non-existent, though titles of various Chinese offices might be employed, and, despite Fan's and Chou's insistence, little evidence exists for the importance of examinations in the selection of officials. According to a nineteenth-century Vietnamese scholar, the Lý selection procedures were personal choice, inheritance by sons, and selling office, in that order.[42] The gradual emergence of Chinese ceremonial activity helped raise the status and mystique of the Vietnamese throne and its capital throughout its loosely held territories. Much as in the "Indianized" states, with their **devarajas** and **purohitas**, the state of Đại Việt and its rulers utilized a foreign pattern of rule to enhance their status in the realm.

The emphasis of the Chinese **pi-chi** on the civil/military, inner/outer dichotomy reflected the division between the capital region and the local areas. Civil officials were in charge of the central area, the foreign specialists so remarked upon by Fan (but not by Chou) would have served here, and the Prime Minister (**Phụ Quốc Thái Úy**) was the central figure therein. During the 1170s, the latter was Tô Hiến Thành, a former soldier who has gone down in Vietnamese history with some praise from later scholars for his steadfastness. This was because he engineered the succession of Lý Cao-tông to the Vietnamese throne in accordance with the proprieties of the sinic world - the heir apparent took the throne (despite pressure and bribes to the contrary from the Queen), honored his mother, waited until the New Year to set up his own reign period, and declared a three-year period of mourning.

Such a pattern had not really been established before, and the reason for it most likely lies in the diplomatic problems with China mentioned above. Tô Hiến Thành in all probability was sure to arrange it so.[43]

The military, on the other hand, acted to keep the local chiefs in line and to maintain a defense against outside threats - in these years, hill peoples, Chams, and Khmer, not to mention Chinese. Local warriors and their elephants, as illustrated on their ceramics, would join the king's forces (note Taylor's mention of "six armies") in a manner not unlike local Malay chiefs and their ships.[44] Basically, the further from the center the less control there was. Perpetually a problem for the Southeast Asian ruler, he had to bring these outer areas into some form of submission to him. Cultural and supernatural awe were used as much as brute force, and this was one purpose for such activities as the blood oath and the royal cult. To hold the territory beyond the capital region, the Lý rulers had slowly developed a system of administration. Putting aside the handing over of territorial segments to local individuals, the Lý had, by the late twelfth century, set up an administrative center (**phủ**) in each of five major regions of the state: the "Protectorate" (**Đô Hộ Phủ**) in the center and east, **Bắc-giang** to the north and east, **Phú-lương** to the north and west, **Đại-thông** to the west and south and **Thanh-hóa** in what was then the distant south. All but the first, in Henri Maspero's reconstruction, faced the hills and dealt with a particular tribal group.[45] Chou noted four of the five **phủ**, leaving out only **Bắc-giang**. The governors of these outer territories, notably **Thanh-hóa** in the south, were undoubtedly autonomous in their action as long as they met their general obligations of loyalty and resource supply. Sitting in the populated areas of the Red River delta, mainly north and west of the capital region, the three governors of **Bắc-giang**, **Phú-lương** and **Đại-thông** acted to defend the center from rebel chieftains and invasions and to provide a certain amount of manpower and revenue for it.[46]

Fan and Chou indicate that officials did not receive a salary controlled by the capital, but were entirely dependent upon local resources, a region's fish and rice. The soldiers did receive some largesse at the same time as they were expected to do some farming of their own.

D. Economic life

The demographic and ecological development of the Vietnamese moved from the higher, hillier area of the Red River valley adjacent to the mountains and north and west of the capital east and south into the true deltaic region. As Vallibhotama and Stargardt describe elsewhere in this volume, the fringes of the great river valleys were settled before people began to penetrate the more treacherous deltaic environment. Gradually, over the centuries, wet rice cultivation moved ever deeper into this watery domain. It would appear that each locality worked out its own hydraulic system, presumably sufficient to allow such cultivation to take place as Stargardt notes for elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Though difficult to describe in any detail, the evidence from village cults in Vietnam points to this movement south and east during the eleventh and twelfth centuries and into the thirteenth, while the lack of official records relating any widespread hydraulic work would indicate the local initiative here also.[47] The opening and holding of

land in this process (by both individuals and temples; see Jacques in this volume) is a subject that requires close study.

The Chinese writers of the late twelfth century naturally point to the staples of Vietnamese life, rice and fish, as forming the economic base. They indicate that a special early ripening strain of rice had come into Vietnam from Champa to supply much of the Vietnamese food, while an indigenous type remained of greater preference. Local production flourished, as may be seen in the ceramics (Guy in this volume). The central government in Thăng-long would not have had the power to tax the local regions directly, and we should see Đại Việt as similar to contemporary states of Southeast Asia in relying, first, on the production of its central base and, second, on the local contacts of the lords it assigned to rule outer territories for the resources which built up its strength.

Another important aspect of the deltaic environment was its juxtaposition to the sea. For Vietnam, the source of wealth that this juxtaposition afforded, foreign trade, has generally been ignored. Yet it is a source which must be looked at much more closely. The era of the Sung dynasty in China was a great period for trade, and the other major inland wet rice states of classical Southeast Asia (Java, Angkor and Pagan) had become increasingly involved in contacts with the international route which stretched from the southeast coast of China to the Mediterranean. Đại Việt too fits this pattern of increasing commercial involvement and expansion in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. We know that its major port was Vân-đồn on the coast east of Thăng-long. The *Đại Việt Sử Ký* has entries for the years 1149 and 1184 (as well as 1285, 1349 and 1360 during the Trần dynasty) which show Vân-đồn as an international port in contact with the area around the Gulf of Siam and with parts of the island world, most particularly Java.[48] By the late twelfth century, Java had become, as Chou noted elsewhere in his book, the most important trade center for Southeast Asia, and Đại Việt was in touch with it via the international route.[49]

Kenneth R. Hall has suggested to us how, as the inland wet rice states came in contact with the international trade route, they began to expand their commercial links. His prime example is Angkor under Suryavarman I in the first half of the eleventh century who sent embassies to the Colas on the southeast coast of India as well as to the Vietnamese.[50] These embassies, to Hall, had a basic economic purpose, however they were recorded by the receiving states. Thereafter, increasing commercialization of interstate contacts may have been part of the rising tensions in the eastern mainland. Sporadically from the 1120's to the 1210's Angkor, Champa and Đại Việt were at war. One cause, at least from the Cham point of view, could have been an apparent growth of a trading route from the southern ports of China across the Gulf of Tonkin to Nghệ-an, south of the Red River delta; from there it seems to have gone across the mountains via Hà-trại Pass to the Mekong River valley and then down to Cambodia. Such a route would have bypassed the access to Angkor by the lower Mekong and consequently threatened Cham control of the trade.[51] The route across the Gulf of Tonkin from China would also have brought numerous Chinese into the lower Red River delta and the lowland areas just south of the delta in Thanh-hóa and Nghệ-an. Evidence for this comes from two Chinese inscriptions located in Thanh-hóa which provide indication of

well-to-do Chinese families established locally. One inscription was dated 1207 and the other perhaps 1161.[52]

Fan, despite his overstatement, gives us a sense of a thriving commerce in Vietnam involving both Chinese and numerous foreigners. He certainly goes out of his way to speak of a flourishing Chinese population there. One result of the situation, he believed, was a flow of manpower and copper cash out of China into Đại Việt, and this must have helped the local economy to develop rapidly. The goods, particularly the metals, which both Fan and Chao list as the products of Vietnam, help place the Vietnamese within the international commercial context. As I have discussed elsewhere,[53] Chao's text paints an implicit picture of Đại Việt's role in the trade. Vietnamese gold and silver probably went to Cambodia (via Nghê-an and the Mekong?), to Kelantan on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, Srivijaya on the east coast of Sumatra, and ultimately Java. In return, the Vietnamese would have gained spices and other local and international goods of value. Another indication of the Vietnamese commercial interests may be seen in Fan's mention of Đại Việt seizing mountain territory in the south which had been Khmer and was a rich source of aromatic woods, a product much in demand on the international route. This seizure may also have been part of the warfare of the twelfth century. Control of such products naturally enhanced a country's place on the international commercial scene and the wealth and power to be derived therefrom.

We may thus postulate an active Vietnamese trading role in the flourishing international commerce. We need to know much more about the social basis of production for the trade, how the trade was organized and the social dynamic leading to the production of the necessary surplus. Nevertheless, we can say that the wealth brought by the trade would have aided the building of political power, stimulated the local economy and introduced foreigners of sufficient expertise to have an impact on both the economic and political spheres.

III. Comments on the Lý-Trần Transition

The change of dynasties in Vietnam from the Lý to the Trần in the thirteenth century seems to have been tied to a number of the points discussed above. First of all, it is widely acknowledged that the Trần family originated in China, probably Fu-chien (as Fan had reported for Lý Công Uẩn) and moved to the lower Red River delta sometime in the first half of the twelfth century. Here, "in the vicinity of the sea", it became wealthy through fishing and gained control of the lower delta region, southeast of the capital. It would not be surprising if the Trần gained from the region's trade and its Chinese connection in their rise to power. At the same time, the central control of the Lý was weakening and regional powers like the Trần rose to compete for dominance. The Trần gained entrance to the capital through marrying into the royal family and eventually were able to transfer powers to themselves.[54]

Having gained power, the Trần were all too aware of the Lý weaknesses which had allowed them to do so. The very flexibility of the social and political systems had aided the rise of the Trần and they acted to restrict this flexibility as best they could. Wolters has noted how the Trần historians commented on the events of the past, most

particularly during the Lý, in such a way as to express their intense dislike for social, political and cultural elements which threatened to disrupt the political scene.[55] Partly because of the worry over the succession problem and partly perhaps because of their Chinese background, the new Trần rulers established a strict rule of patrilineality and primogeniture in the royal succession. To make sure that the eldest son did succeed to the throne after his father, the early Trần kings began the innovation of abdicating in favor of their eldest sons and placing the latter on the throne while they themselves retained actual power. The Trần, to quote Wolters, "improvised the practice of parallel-cousin marriages between the heir and a Trần cousin, the practice of installing a single empress and the practice of early nomination of heirs".[56] By providing such a structure to a fluid situation, the Trần moved to cut down on the competitive position of rival families backing potential heirs related to them. Yet it should be noted that the Trần did not attempt to push these principles of patrilineality and primogeniture beyond the royal court and into Vietnamese society at large. This would occur only in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries under the Lê and Mạc rulers of those years.[57]

On the other hand, as far as we can see at this time, the Trần did try to maintain a ritual continuity from Lý times. We have already spoken of the existence of the royal cult of the King of Heaven, **Đế-thích** (Indra), in Trần as well as Lý ritual and of the continuation of the blood oath of allegiance. In this way, the Trần benefited from the heroic image and supernatural prowess of the Lý rulers as established in their rites. These contacts with the supernatural would remain a part of the Vietnamese state until displaced by the rise of the Chinese model after the crisis of the late fourteenth century.[58]

Where the Trần did change governmental procedure was in administration. Wishing to insure a better control over the countryside and its resources, human and material, the Trần kings fairly rapidly began to push the hand of the central government more directly into the countryside. During the mid-thirteenth century, they established what we might call an experiment in bureaucratic administration. The Trần broke up the system of the five **phủ**, raising sub-units up to an equal level. More officials were allowed access to the throne. Population registers were set up. The examination system was overhauled and its products used in provincial administration, not merely as adjuncts of the royal court. For the first time, a provincial administrative system appeared and was staffed to some degree with graduates of the examinations. Through this structure, we have in 1255 the first attempt to coordinate the diking system throughout the Red River delta and in Thanh-hóa to the south.[59] An active role in economic development and the undoubted encouragement of foreign trade probably meant the continued growth of the Vietnamese economy through the thirteenth century and into the fourteenth.[60]

Our study of the Chinese **pi-chi** from the 1170s has allowed us to probe into the nature of the Lý state and the conditions therein which led to the Trần dynasty and its administrative changes. Yet one major area which these Chinese scholar-officials did not probe was Buddhism. We are given glimpses of public life and public cults, but not of the belief system which existed in the country and which continued under the Trần. In this volume, Taylor describes the important Buddhist

developments of eleventh-century Đại Việt and Mabbett places the Mahayana Buddhism of Champa in a broad context, "nourished by vigorous international cultural traffic". Though scholar-officials from China might see little of note in what would have been to them an alien (hence barbarian) belief system, we need to obtain a better understanding of Vietnamese Buddhism. The Phong-nhã caves mentioned by Mabbett lay just south of Vietnamese territory at that time and would be a good place to begin an examination of the interrelations between Vietnamese and Cham Buddhism, with both placed in the international context.

The Vietnamese and Chinese material available to us on Đại Việt in the Lý period join with the discussion at the conference to indicate that no clear cultural faultline existed between the area of greater Chinese influence and that of greater Indian influence. Trần Quốc Vượng[61] shows us that scholarship in Vietnam today supports this notion of no major division between Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia through history. For Vượng, these Southeast Asian elements have remained rooted in the villages of the lowlands, with their wet rice culture and their spirits and temples and can be seen as well in the Buddhist monarchy of the Lý period.

The history of Đại Việt in these early centuries also fits well with Hermann Kulke's description in this volume of the structural changes undergone by its major contemporaries (especially Angkor and Java). Đại Việt shares with its southern neighbors the **mandala** nature of its domain, the changes in structure through local, regional and imperial phases, the borrowing of a foreign concept of universal ruler, and the achievement of a more integrated central focus and ritual. The time has come to treat Đại Việt as an integral, not an exceptional, part of Southeast Asia and to conduct our teaching and our studies in this vein.

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8. **Sung Shih** (1903 edition), 448, pp.5a-6b; Ngô Sĩ Liên, **Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư**, trans. (Hanoi, 1972), I, pp.173-4 (hereafter **TT**); Ma, **WHTK**, p. 2591; St. Denis (1883), II, pp.316-20. In using the St Denis trans-10/25/85 Fri 16:50:16 lation of Ma Tuan-lin, the reader must be careful of what Paul Pelliot, **Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient (BEFEO)**, 4 (1904), p.138, termed "his habitual negligence" where "the translator has read his text poorly". St Denis tends to gloss over some points rather than directly translate them.
9. Ma, **WHTK**, p.2594; St Denis (1883), II, p.352.
10. Ma, **WHTK**, p.2594; St Denis (1883), II, p.360.
11. Wolters (1983), p.59, citing the **Sung Hui Yao Chi-Kao**, fan-i 4, p.7738. Taylor in this volume notes 1164 as the date the Chinese emperor entitled the Vietnamese ruler as **Quốc-vương** instead of **Quân-vương**, thus moving the Vietnamese from "internal" to "external" status.
12. Ma, **WHTK**, p.2595; St Denis (1883), II, pp.363-8; Chou, **LWTT**, pp.17-18; Netolitzky (1977), pp.29-31.

13. Ma, **WHTK**, pp.2594-5; St Denis (1883), II, pp.353-4, 357, 366-7; Wang Gungwu, "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia, a Background Essay" in J. K. Fairbank, ed., **The Chinese World Order** (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p.47.
14. Ma, **WHTK**, p.2594; St Denis (1883), II, pp.355, 360-2.
15. Ma, **WHTK**, p.2594; St Denis (1883), II, pp.349-50, 359-61. For a sketch of early Vietnamese currency and metal production, see Whitmore (1983) in n.48 below.
16. Ma, **WHTK**, p.2594; St Denis (1883), II, pp.354-6, 360-1.
17. Loc. cit.
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19. Ho Ping-ti, **Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953** (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp.170-5, gives an excellent description of the impact of this rice on the economy of China.
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23. Hirth & Rockhill (1911), pp.45-6.
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28. A. T. Kirsch, "Kinship, Genealogical Claims, and Societal Integration in Ancient Khmer Society: An Interpretation", in Cowan & Wolters (1982), pp.190-202; Wolters (1976), pp.203-26; see also Wolters (1982), pp.7-8.
29. See also Wolters (1982), pp.28-9, 32.
30. Wolters (1976), pp.223-6; in this volume, Wolters notes the Trần succession pattern and describes the weaknesses which occurred therein during the fourteenth century.
31. Taylor (1983), pp.13, 34, 36, 39, 75-8, 130.

32. Wolters (1976), p.212.
33. For eclecticism in Vietnam, see J. K. Whitmore, "Foreign Influences and the Vietnamese Cultural Core: a Discussion of the Premodern Period", in Trương Bửu Lâm, ed., **Borrowing and Adaptation in Vietnamese Culture** (Hawaii, forthcoming); Taylor and Guy in this volume.
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35. **TT** (Hanoi), I, p.230; IV, pp.81-2; K. W. Taylor, "The Rise of Đại Việt and the Establishment of Thăng-long", in K. R. Hall & J. K. Whitmore, eds., **Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History** (Ann Arbor, 1976), p.179; J. K. Whitmore, "Mạc Đăng Dung" in L. C. Goodrich & Fang Chao-ying, eds., **Dictionary of Ming Biography** (N.Y., 1976), II, p.1031. Taylor in this volume records that, in 1037, the Vietnamese ruler called on the "Emperor of Heaven" (**Thiên-đế**) concerning a matter, while Vương noted at the conference the existence of a temple to **Đế-thích** in the center of Hanoi and, in this volume, the cult of Indra itself. I wish to thank Keith W. Taylor for his initial research on **Đế-thích**.
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37. Lê Tấn, **An-nam Chí-lược** (Huế, 1961), p.46.
38. J. K. Whitmore, "The Oath of Allegiance in Southeast Asia", paper presented at the Midwest Regional Conference of the Association of Asian Studies, Ann Arbor, Mich., October 1982.
39. **VSL** (Hanoi), pp.133, 137, 153, 193, 197, 213.
40. Wolters (1982), pp.18-20.
41. *Ibid.*, pp.16-33.
42. Phan Huy Chú, **Lịch Triều Hiến Chương Loại Chí**, trans. (Hanoi, 1960), II, p.69.
43. *Ibid.*, I, p.183; II, pp.154, 160, 178; Wolters (1976), p.209.
44. In this volume, see Guy for the ceramics, Taylor for the "six armies" and Manguin for the manner in which Malay fleets were formed.
45. Maspero (1916), pp.30-1, 40-1.
46. *Ibid.*, pp.32-5; **TT** (Hanoi), I, pp.276-7, 281.
47. P. Gourou, **Les Paysans du Delta Tonkinois**, second ed. (Paris, 1965), pp.83-4, 114-9, 135. See also Taylor in this volume, citing the work of Yumio Sakurai.

48. TT (Hanoi), I, pp.281, 295; II, pp.54, 137-8, 147. Note also Taylor's mention in this volume of foreign merchants gathering in Thăng-long.
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55. Wolters (1976); (1979).
56. Wolters (1979), pp.440-1.
57. Whitmore (1984), 305-06.
58. For fourteenth century Vietnam, see Wolters and Ungar in this volume and J. K. Whitmore, **Vietnam, Hồ Quý Ly, and the Ming, 1371-1421**, New Haven, Conn., 1985.
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60. Whitmore (1983), p.366 and Guy in this volume.
61. In this volume; "Vietnamese Civilization in the Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries (in Vietnamese)", **Nghiên Cứu Lịch Sử** (Historical Research) (Hanoi), 198 (1981), pp.4-10; and with Nguyễn Vĩnh Long, "Hanoi from Prehistory to the Nineteenth Century", **Vietnamese Studies**, 48 (1977).

